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Many textualists see canons of interpretation as a means to deal with statutory 
ambiguity, while nontextualists are more likely to turn to legislative history. This 
Essay explores some of the problems with each approach: for canons, determining 
which context is the best one to analyze, and for legislative history, determining 
which statements are reliable and which are hot air. 
A conference about “best practices” for legal inquiry supposes 
that there are practices. In the field of legal interpretation, that 
assumption is doubtful. The Supreme Court is dominantly textu-
alist (perhaps Professors Abbe Gluck and Frederick Schauer 
would prefer formalist) but has not insisted that all other federal 
judges use the same approach—and the Justices themselves hap-
pily sign pragmatic opinions written by Justice Breyer. They 
never use legislative history to contradict a statute but sometimes 
use it to confirm statutory meaning arrived at, they tell us, by 
other means. No Justice these days is a purposivist after the fash-
ion of the old approach of Professors Henry Hart and Albert 
Sacks.1 All are delighted to say that the question is not what di-
rection the legislators wanted to go in, but how far, and that you 
can’t tease that out of a purpose.2 The law is a multidimensional 
vector, not an arrow in one dimension. At the same time as the 
Justices tell us to pay heed to the “intent” of Congress, they con-
cede that “intent” is empty and that meaning is objective, if only 
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 1 See generally Henry M. Hart Jr and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic 
Problems in the Making and Application of Law (Cambridge tentative ed 1958). 
 2 See Rodriguez v United States, 480 US 522, 526 (1987) (per curiam) (“Deciding 
what competing values will or will not be sacrificed to the achievement of a particular 
objective is the very essence of legislative choice—and it frustrates rather than effectuates 
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quoted propositions about statutory interpretation. 
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because we can’t peer into the heads of the median legislators, 
who usually are silent, even though it is the median voter whose 
views ought to matter. If we do not have a dominant practice of 
interpretation, we cannot think about how to test claims. 
My goal today is to discuss how textualists approach the sub-
ject—or at least how I do. Intents are irrelevant even if discerna-
ble (which they aren’t), because our Constitution provides for the 
enactment and approval of texts, not of intents. The text is not 
evidence of the law; it is the law. I am leery of pragmatic argu-
ments because they simultaneously depart from the enacted texts 
and give too much power to judges. That’s fine in a common-law 
world but not in the domain of statutes and regulations. When 
texts run out of meaning, we should put them down and go to 
other sources of law, rather than invent things in their name. I’ve 
made that argument at length elsewhere and won’t repeat it 
here.3 This is an argument about jurisprudence rather than lin-
guistics, and I’ve been trying for thirty-one years on the bench to 
show how it can be done. I leave to others an evaluation of what 
this experiment shows. 
Having worked on textualist interpretation for a long time, I 
may have seemed to the organizers of this Symposium a good per-
son to describe how the process works—to produce an interpretive 
algorithm that then may be evaluated free of the problems that 
arise when evaluating the results of concrete cases. Every case 
presents a real problem, and people have preferences over the out-
comes independent of how the judges produced those outcomes. It 
would be best to pare away the outcomes and concentrate on the 
theory of meaning that generated them. 
The problem is that even textualism, which is relatively con-
strained compared to pragmatism or purposivism, does not have 
an algorithm. A short time ago, Justice Scalia and Bryan Garner 
produced a book on textualist method that set out fifty-seven ap-
proved canons,4 and repeatedly the book says that one or another 
canon is not definitive but that context matters. No algorithm 
there—nothing a well-designed expert system could use to replace 
judges with computer code and a big database. Computers have 
 
 3 See generally, for example, Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U Chi L 
Rev 533 (1983); Frank H. Easterbrook, Textualism and the Dead Hand, 66 Geo Wash L 
Rev 1119 (1998); Frank H. Easterbrook, Judicial Discretion in Statutory Interpretation, 
57 Okla L Rev 1 (2004). 
 4 See generally Antonin Scalia and Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpreta-
tion of Legal Texts (Thomson/West 2012). 
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triumphed at chess, Go, and Jeopardy, but not at the game of legal 
interpretation. 
I want to illustrate my point about the absence of method by 
looking at two issues. First, can an apparently clear canon, the 
rule of the immediate antecedent, generate predictable outcomes? 
Second, can a more sophisticated use of legislative history, stress-
ing how Congress actually behaves, do so? Gluck’s essay for this 
Symposium champions “The CBO Canon” as such an approach,5 
and I have a good deal of sympathy, because meaning depends on 
how an interpretive community reacts to words and the Congres-
sional Budget Office lies outside the legislature. But instead of 
analyzing her proposal, I look into the older proposal that judges 
search for costly promises and ignore the rest. 
So I start with a canon. I am skeptical of canons, and not 
simply because of Professor Karl Llewellyn’s famous list of canons 
and countercanons.6 One could revise the list, as Justice Scalia 
and Garner set out to do, to avoid the direct conflict. My concern 
is different: every canon implicitly begins or ends with the state-
ment “unless the context indicates otherwise,” which potentially 
leaves so much room for maneuver that the canon isn’t doing 
much work. Indeed, a reference to “the context” does not even pin 
down what context. Is it the immediate linguistic context? The 
context of the whole statute, à la Professor Akhil Amar’s intratex-
tualism?7 Does it matter if the statute was cobbled together by 
very different legislatures over forty-plus years, like the Clean Air 
Act? Perhaps it means the economic context. And if it means that, 
can’t a judge do anything that would be appropriate in a common-
law case? 
The United States Code has quite a few explicit context 
clauses, including the one that begins 1 USC § 1, the Dictionary 
Act. The Justices once split five to four about whether this clause 
means linguistic or economic context (the five voted for linguis-
tic).8 The definition of “securities” also contains a context clause,9 
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 7 See generally Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 117 Harv L Rev 747 (1999). 
 8 See Rowland v California Men’s Colony, Unit II Men’s Advisory Council, 506 US 
194, 199–201 (1993). 
 9 15 USC § 77b(a). 
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and in securities cases the Justices have used the economic con-
text,10 without explaining why or trying to justify what amounts 
to a policy-making role, which definitions, of all things, are sup-
posed to deny to the judiciary. 
Still, canons are inevitable, because all language depends on 
them. Canons tell us how to fill in gaps, and all language has 
gaps. Ludwig Wittgenstein tells us that gaps are inevitable be-
cause new cases always arise and speakers can’t give themselves 
“ought” statements.11 But forget the philosophy of language and 
ask how we speak. To take an example from a case decided re-
cently,12 if a friend asks you to introduce her to “an actor, director, 
or producer involved with the new Star Wars movie,” you know 
immediately that the Star Wars clause modifies all three terms; 
an actor from an Ingmar Bergman film would not do. This is the 
principle of parsimony; people use the shortest expression that 
will convey meaning, because going on at length is hostile.13 What 
would you think of a person who said “an actor involved with the 
new Star Wars movie, or a producer involved with the new Star 
Wars movie, or a director involved with the new Star Wars 
movie”? 
Speakers depend on canons and contexts that listeners will 
supply, else expression would be interminably long. Imagine a 
short law: “Anyone who intentionally kills someone else must be 
put to death.” Every reader knows that this does not mean that a 
cop on the street can shoot a murderer with impunity. Nor does it 
mean that the prosecutor must pursue every reported crime. The 
statute supposes a legal process that will determine who is a mur-
derer. It supposes (or at least does not foreclose) the possibility of 
defenses, such as self-defense or necessity. Only by making as-
sumptions about how other statutes, and the legal system as a 
whole, interact with a text is it possible to adopt manageable 
 
 10 See generally, for example, United Housing Foundation, Inc v Forman, 421 US 
837 (1975) (concluding that shares of stock representing rights to apartments are not se-
curities); Marine Bank v Weaver, 455 US 551 (1982) (concluding that notes for indebted-
ness to a neighbor are not securities); Reves v Ernst & Young, 494 US 56 (1990) (concluding 
that corporate demand notes are securities, though personal checks would not be, notwith-
standing the statutory language). 
 11 See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations §§ 185–90 at 80–83e 
(Wiley-Blackwell 4th ed 2009) (P.M.S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte, trans). 
 12 Lockhart v United States, 136 S Ct 958, 969 (2016) (Kagan dissenting). 
 13 See generally Geoffrey P. Miller, Pragmatics and the Maxims of Interpretation, 
1990 Wis L Rev 1179. 
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rules.14 And this means that judges must apply canons and back-
ground norms, just as everyone else does. The problem lies in in-
determinacy. 
The Star Wars hypothetical comes from Justice Kagan’s dis-
sent in Lockhart v United States,15 and I use that case and a pre-
decessor, Paroline v United States,16 to illustrate the difficulty of 
identifying the appropriate context. Both cases involve the canon 
usually called the rule of the immediate antecedent, together with 
related canons that Justice Scalia and Garner call the “Series-
Qualifier Canon” and the “Nearest-Reasonable-Referent 
Canon.”17 
These three canons start from the linguistic understanding 
that, in a list of disparate items, a clause modifies the item near-
est to it. To take an example from Barnhart v Thomas,18 if a par-
ent warns a child that a house party or any house-damaging ac-
tivity will lead to discipline, this means that a party is a cause of 
discipline whether or not the house is damaged. The parent likely 
wanted to pick the biggest risk (which might entail drinking) for 
separate treatment, followed by a general rule. If the damage 
clause modified both any party and any other activity, then the 
reference to the party would be pointless, and the parent would 
just have said, “If you damage the house while we’re out, you’ll be 
grounded.” 
Simple enough in principle. Now try to apply it. Notice the 
statement “in a list of disparate items.” If you say “statutes, reg-
ulations, or Constitution of the United States,” the phrase “of the 
United States” applies to all three items; that’s how normal peo-
ple using a principle of parsimony would hear it. They are not 
disparate. Fine. This sets up Lockhart. 
Section 2252 of Title 18 covers some forms of sexual exploita-
tion of minors. Subsection (a)(4) deals with possessing or distrib-
uting sexual images of minors on Indian reservations, military 
bases, and other places quaintly called “the special maritime and 
territorial jurisdiction of the United States.” Section 2252(b)(2) 
provides a minimum ten-year sentence for a person convicted un-
der subsection (a)(4) 
 
 14 For additional discussion of this point, see my “opinion” in The Case of the Speluncean 
Explorers: Revisited, 112 Harv L Rev 1876, 1913–17 (1999). 
 15 136 S Ct 958, 969 (2016) (Kagan dissenting). 
 16 134 S Ct 1710 (2014). 
 17 Scalia and Garner, Reading Law at 144–53 (cited in note 4). 
 18 540 US 20, 27–28 (2003). 
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if such person has a prior conviction under this chapter, chap-
ter 71, chapter 109A, or chapter 117, or under section 920 of 
title 10 (article 120 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice), 
or under the laws of any State relating to aggravated sexual 
abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a 
minor or ward, or the production, possession, receipt, mail-
ing, sale, distribution, shipment, or transportation of child 
pornography. 
The question in Lockhart was what the phrase “involving a mi-
nor” modifies—just the immediately preceding phrase “abusive 
sexual conduct” or the whole string “aggravated sexual abuse, 
sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct.” Avondale Lockhart had 
a prior conviction for sexual abuse, but that conviction did not 
stem from a crime against a minor, and when he was convicted of 
the child-porn offense under § 2252(a)(4), he opposed the prosecu-
tor’s argument that the minimum sentence was ten years.19 
He lost in the Supreme Court—and don’t assume that this 
was some ideological fight. Justice Sotomayor wrote for the ma-
jority and Justice Kagan for the dissent. Both opinions are textu-
alist. No one asked what Congress ought to have done or in-
tended; everyone wanted instead to know what the words meant. 
But how does one parse those words? 
All eight participating Justices (Justice Scalia had died 
shortly before the opinion’s release) accepted the immediate-
antecedent canon and its relatives. The opinions proceed as if the 
Scalia-Garner book, Reading Law, had been enacted as an adden-
dum to the Dictionary Act. But the Justices could not agree on 
whether the list “aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abu-
sive sexual conduct” contained like items or unlike items. Justice 
Kagan thought the items alike, so canonically the qualifier “in-
volving a minor” applied to all three. The majority thought them 
unlike, and to make that point the majority invoked context. 
Fine, but what context? One context was that the series “ag-
gravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct” 
seems to have been lifted from the titles of several statutes, two 
of which are not limited to minors. The dissent replied that this 
may show only that the mandatory minimum applies to the sub-
set of the underlying conduct that does involve minors. We have 
a draw. 
 
 19 Lockhart, 136 S Ct at 961–62. 
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The majority chose, as an additional context, the fact that the 
list of statutes preceding the state-law portion identifies some fed-
eral statutes by name, and the “involving a minor” qualifier does 
not apply to them. What sense would it make, the majority asked, 
to have a ten-year minimum when a prior federal felony has an 
adult victim, yet to limit the enhancement to state crimes with 
minor victims? To this the dissent replied that the majority had 
slipped from the linguistic to a functional context. The state-law 
phrase poses a problem that enumeration of federal statutes does 
not. Congress can identify qualifying federal statutes by citation; 
that won’t work with state laws. A drafter is charier about a 
clause with generalities, because who knows what some state 
might call “sexual abuse”? Far better to apply “involving a minor” 
across all state laws than to take a chance. I make this another 
draw.20 
I am attracted to the dissent’s approach but get nervous be-
cause Justice Kagan wrote (as Justice Scalia often did) about the 
need to interpret federal statutes as ordinary readers hear the 
language.21 The problem is that ordinary readers are dealing with 
newspapers, not statutes. Most norms of ordinary linguistic inter-
pretation assume cooperation between the speaker and the 
hearer. That’s what gives Justice Kagan’s Star Wars hypothetical 
its punch. But statutes are written by noncooperative actors; they 
may reflect compromises between violently opposed blocs in Con-
gress, and this law was designed to control the conduct of people 
who really want to have child porn. Using the norms of private 
speech to tell us what legislative texts mean is problematic. Yet 
we lack any special set of interpretive norms for legislative 
speech. 
Justices sometimes tell Congress how to write, if they want 
to reduce the vagary of interpretation. Gluck and Professor Lisa 
Bressman find that legislators don’t pay attention,22 though the 
 
 20 See id at 968; id at 975, 978 (Kagan dissenting). 
 21 See id at 969, 978 (Kagan dissenting). 
 22 See generally Abbe R. Gluck and Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation 
from the Inside—an Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Can-
ons: Part I, 65 Stan L Rev 901 (2013). 
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sort of problem exemplified by Lockhart is one covered by the leg-
islative drafting manuals in the House and Senate. The problem 
is solvable by dividing texts into subparts.23 
Imagine two possibilities: 
the laws of any State relating to (a) aggravated sexual abuse, 
(b) sexual abuse, or (c) abusive sexual conduct involving a mi-
nor or ward. 
That form of division makes it clear that “involving a minor or 
ward” deals only with division (c). Or consider a different option: 
the laws of any State relating to 
 aggravated sexual abuse, 
 sexual abuse, or 
 abusive sexual conduct 
involving a minor or ward. 
By indenting the three subclassifications, and bringing the “mi-
nor or ward” language back to the margin, the formatting tells us 
that the “minor or ward” qualifier applies to all three. 
Garner and the drafters of the House and Senate manuals 
would not be happy with this indent-and-return-to-margin ap-
proach, and not only because it makes citation harder.24 And 
Gluck would not be happy, because drafters ignore the manuals—
and, worse, formatting sometimes is applied after the text has 
been voted on.25 But at least a court could say that if drafters do 
these things, they get the expected result, and if they don’t, then 
judges make educated guesses. They just lack a standard method 
for educating those guesses. 
But even this turns out to be too simple. Consider 18 USC 
§ 2259, another statute in the burgeoning list of federal sex 
crimes. Section 2259 says that a sex offender must make restitu-
tion for the full amount of a victim’s losses. Section 2259(b)(3) is 
a definition clause. It reads: 
 
 23 See Legislative Drafting Manual § 112 at *9–12 (Office of the Legislative Counsel, 
US Senate, Feb 1997), archived at http://perma.cc/66QV-9ASN; House Legislative Coun-
sel’s Manual on Drafting Style §§ 311–12 at *23–25 (Office of the Legislative Counsel, US 
House of Representatives, Nov 1995), archived at http://perma.cc/4LYV-DE7C. 
 24 See Bryan A. Garner, Guidelines for Drafting and Editing Legislation § 3.4(E) at 
96 (RosePen 2016) (“Avoid unnumbered ‘dangling’ sections.”); Legislative Drafting Manual 
§ 112(d) at *10 (cited in note 23). 
 25 See Lisa Schultz Bressman and Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the 
Inside—an Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: 
Part II, 66 Stan L Rev 725, 750–52 (2014). 
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For purposes of this subsection, the term “full amount of the 
victim’s losses” includes any costs incurred by the victim 
for— 
(A) medical services relating to physical, psychiatric, or psy-
chological care; 
(B) physical and occupational therapy or rehabilitation; 
(C) necessary transportation, temporary housing, and child 
care expenses; 
(D) lost income; 
(E) attorneys’ fees, as well as other costs incurred; and 
(F) any other losses suffered by the victim as a proximate re-
sult of the offense. 
This time Congress did what I just said would clear every-
thing up. It broke the list into separately numbered sections. So 
we have, for example, “(D) lost income” with no qualifier and 
“(F) any other losses suffered by the victim as a proximate result 
of the offense.” Yet, by a vote of five to four, the Court held that 
“as a proximate result of the offense” modifies all six things in this 
list.26 Again, this was not the five you would expect. The majority 
was Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Alito, and Kagan; the 
four dissenters were Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, 
Thomas, and Sotomayor. This not only is not the newspapers’  
liberal/conservative divide but also does not match the division in 
Lockhart, in which Justice Sotomayor wrote for the majority and 
Justice Kagan for the dissent. Justices Alito, Kennedy, and  
Ginsburg were in both majorities, and no one was in both dis-
sents.27 This is the work of a Court trying hard to interpret en-
acted texts, not to carry out an agenda—but why didn’t they take 
the cue from the statutory numbering scheme? 
The answer may be that no one asked them to do so,28 and 
even at the Supreme Court the advocates’ presentations can 
knock out valuable options. The second and more important rea-
son is that the context of the legal system has its own conse-
quence. Think back to my example of the murder statute. It does 
not mention self-defense, but neither does it foreclose that de-
fense, and in this legal system defenses are generally applicable 
unless knocked out. So, too, causation is the norm unless knocked 
out. So, when Congress writes “(D) lost income,” it means “income 
 
 26 See generally Paroline, 134 S Ct 1710. 
 27 Compare Lockhart, 136 S Ct at 961, with Paroline, 134 S Ct at 1716. 
 28 At least none of the parties’ briefs did. I have not read all of the amicus briefs. 
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lost as a result of the violation”; anything else would be so unusual 
that judges would want to see it in writing. One might reply that 
the express causation requirement in subsection (F) implied its 
negation elsewhere, but that’s not an application of the immedi-
ate-antecedent canon. It would be an inversion of the normal rule 
about the role of causation in damages. So Paroline isn’t about 
canons after all; it is about how much the context of the legal sys-
tem is used to pull meaning from isolated statutes. And this, too, 
is a subject that can’t be reduced to an algorithm. I don’t think 
that either the majority or the dissent in either Lockhart or 
Paroline can be called wrong. We cannot get around the fact that 
language is incomplete. 
I can imagine one approach that would have the mechanical 
nature required of a rule. The Rule of Lenity as currently under-
stood says, “If ambiguity, then defendant prevails.”29 Yet all in-
teresting language (including most that reaches the Supreme 
Court) is ambiguous. The Rule of Lenity does not say how serious 
the ambiguity must be, and the Justices do not agree on what 
“ambiguity” means for purposes of the rule.30 Suppose we replace 
“ambiguous” with the rule that, if three Justices think that the 
defendant prevails on the merits (that is, without regard to the 
Rule of Lenity), then there is enough uncertainty to require a de-
cision for the defendant. This creates an algorithm. But as far as 
I know, none of the Justices has ever proposed the adoption of a 
doctrine that depends on anything other than four votes (to grant 
certiorari) or a majority (to decide on the merits). 
Let me turn from the immediate-antecedent canon to Judge 
Katzmann’s call for other judges to make more and better use of 
legislative history.31 
Like other textualists, I object to the use of legislative history 
for two principal reasons. 
First, it is unreliable. Statements may be strategic, but I put 
that possibility aside for today. Suppose all statements are candid 
disclosures of their authors’ beliefs. Still, they may represent the 
views of only one person. Statements in committee reports speak 
for a majority of the committee’s majority, which usually means 
just a handful of legislators. The committee staff may summarize 
 
 29 Scalia and Garner, Reading Law at 296–302 (cited in note 4). 
 30 Judge Brett M. Kavanaugh thoughtfully develops this point in Fixing Statutory 
Interpretation. See Brett M. Kavanaugh, Book Review, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 
129 Harv L Rev 2118, 2134–44 (2016). 
 31 See Robert A. Katzmann, Judging Statutes 39 (Oxford 2014). 
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the views of ten Senators or twenty Representatives, but what 
judges need to know is the understanding of the median legislator 
whose vote created the majority on the floor—and the median leg-
islator is silent. 
Second, it is illegitimate. Not illegitimate in the sense that 
the committee staff is off on a lark; Congress thinks that record-
ing this material serves a function, else it would close down the 
process.32 What I mean by “illegitimate” might be better expressed 
as “insufficient to constitute legislation under our system of gov-
ernance.” An opinion poll among legislators does not create a legal 
obligation, even if we are very confident that the poll is statisti-
cally valid. Nor does a majority vote create a law, if before enact-
ment the bill is sabotaged by an unpopular amendment and then 
killed off by its own sponsors. No judge would dream of declaring 
the bill enacted, even if the judge were perfectly confident that 
the unamended text would have passed. Tactics that allow minor-
ities to frustrate majorities are part of the legislative process. 
What the Constitution requires for legislation is concurrent, 
bicameral enactments by the legislature and signature by the 
President. Legislative history flunks the bicameralism require-
ment; neither house of Congress actually votes on the stuff.33 And 
it flunks the requirement that legislation be presented to the Pres-
ident for signature or veto. A President who agrees with the en-
rolled bill but disagrees with the legislative history has no recourse 
but to add some “history” of his own—the signing statement.34 
Like most other textualists, I am willing to consult legislative 
history as a cue to linguistic usage, even though not as an author-
itative guide to meaning. Wittgenstein showed that words don’t 
have internal meanings, and that the concept of speakers’ mean-
ing also is empty.35 Meaning depends not on the contents of the 
 
 32 This implies, as Professor Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz concludes in Federal Rules 
of Statutory Interpretation, that Congress could lift any bar on the use of legislative his-
tory, other than the constitutional-legitimacy one discussed below, by specifying what 
force any particular history has—and could lift the Constitution’s bar by enacting the his-
tory, as it did in one section of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. See Nicholas Quinn 
Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 Harv L Rev 2085, 2109 (2002). 
 33 Often for good reasons. See Kavanaugh, Book Review, 129 Harv L Rev at 2122–28 
(cited in note 30). See also generally John F. Manning, Book Review, Why Does Congress 
Vote on Some Texts but Not Others?, 51 Tulsa L Rev 559 (2016). 
 34 That many members of Congress who contribute barrels of ink to the Congressional 
Record deem presidential signing statements illegitimate is one of government’s ironies. 
 35 See Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations § 693 at 181e (cited in note 11) 
(“[N]othing is more wrong-headed than to call meaning something a mental activity!”). 
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speaker’s head, but on the reaction of the contemporaneous inter-
pretive community. This is why when understanding the Consti-
tution it is proper to consider both The Federalist and James 
Madison’s nemesis “Brutus”; contributions to the public debate 
show how people at the time used legal words and understood the 
document’s meaning. For many laws, however, there is no compa-
rable public debate. When Congress in 1922 used the word “agri-
culture” in the Capper-Volstead Act, exempting agriculture from 
the antitrust laws, did it mean “agriculture” as understood in 
1922, or “agriculture” as it would come to be understood in later 
decades?36 Legislative history might shed light—not because it 
would reveal authoritatively one reading of the statute, but be-
cause it might illuminate how people in 1922 used the word. 
Gluck says that the CBO Canon would not run afoul of these 
concerns, and I have some sympathy with that view, though I 
need to give it more thought. Here I want to discuss an older ar-
gument for identifying reliable legislative history—an argument 
advanced by McNollgast, a portmanteau of Professors Mathew 
McCubbins, Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast. 
McNollgast have proposed that judges could check the relia-
bility of legislative history not by trying to deduce whether it 
spoke for a majority, or for swing voters, but by asking whether it 
represented a costly commitment.37 The proposal rests on two 
ideas. First, some legislators occupy positions that, as a result of 
agenda control, exercise inordinate influence; their statements 
may be informative, while what everyone else says is just wind. 
Second, statements by the influential legislators affect their rep-
utations as dealmakers. If their statements are accurate, then 
deals they propose will be believable, and they will keep their in-
fluence (and perhaps acquire more); if they make false promises, 
their reputations will decline, and so will their influence. McNollgast 
suggested searching for the people with agenda influence or other 
holdup powers and then asking whether their statements were 
reliable. Influential legislators might make statements that are 
 
 36 For a decision addressing this question, see generally National Broiler Marketing 
Association v United States, 436 US 816 (1978). This case arose from the provision of the 
Capper-Volstead Act that authorized those “engaged in the production of agricultural 
products” to “act together in associations . . . in interstate and foreign commerce.” Capper-
Volstead Act, 42 Stat 388, 388 (1922), codified at 7 USC § 291. 
 37 See generally McNollgast, Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory 
in Statutory Interpretation, 57 L & Contemp Probs 3 (Winter 1994); McNollgast, Positive 
Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory Interpretation, 80 Georgetown L J 
705 (1992). 
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known by their colleagues to be hot air—stuff to fool interest 
groups, perhaps, or to take in credulous judges, but not capable of 
fooling other members of Congress. But when key legislators 
make concrete deals with other members, their words must be re-
liable because their reputations are at stake. 
The proposal sounds nice in the abstract, but the original ar-
ticles were short on particulars. Weingast, together with Daniel 
Rodriguez (now dean of Northwestern Pritzker School of Law), set 
out to rectify that by conducting a case study.38 They chose United 
Steelworkers v Weber,39 in which the Supreme Court held that Ti-
tle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits racial dis-
crimination in employment, permits an employer to give a prefer-
ence to black applicants for jobs.40 The statute provides that it is 
unlawful “to fail or refuse to hire . . . any individual . . . because 
of such individual’s race.”41 The court of appeals had held that, 
when applicants of one race receive credit simply because of their 
race, applicants of another race necessarily will not be hired “be-
cause” they have the wrong race. The Court concluded in Weber 
that the statute does not enact a system of formal equality; it was 
designed to prevent the majority from discriminating against a 
minority, not to prevent the majority from discriminating against 
itself. The Court used legislative history to support this atextual 
reading.42 
One might respond that the Court missed the lessons of public-
choice theory. There is no “majority”; there is only a coalition of 
minorities, and an intense minority may be able to obtain prefer-
ential treatment by vote trading on other issues.43 Or one might 
respond, in a traditional legal fashion, that the Court looked over 
the heads of the crowd and picked out its friends among the 
 
 38 See generally Daniel B. Rodriguez and Barry R. Weingast, The Positive Political 
Theory of Legislative History: New Perspectives on the 1964 Civil Rights Act and Its Inter-
pretation, 151 U Pa L Rev 1417 (2003). 
 39 United Steelworkers of America, AFL–CIO–CLC v Weber, 443 US 193 (1979). 
 40 Id at 209. 
 41 42 USC § 2000e–2(a)(1). 
 42 Weber, 443 US at 200, 203–07. 
 43 See Daniel A. Farber and Philip P. Frickey, Law and Public Choice: A Critical 
Introduction 40–62 (Chicago 1991); Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice III 104–08  
(Cambridge 2003). 
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speakers in Congress,44 so legislative history was used only to mis-
lead the public about a decision reached on other grounds.45 But 
Rodriguez and Weingast proceeded differently. They asked 
whether the Court had identified the legislators with deal-making, 
or deal-breaking, power. Then they asked whether the Court dis-
tinguished between statements offered as fodder for interest 
groups and statements made as commitments to other members 
of Congress. Rodriguez and Weingast found abject judicial failure 
on both issues. 
Justice Brennan’s opinion for the Court in Weber quoted 
freely from legislators who favored a pro-preference approach, or 
at least were neutral, whether or not that person had any influ-
ence. Many quotations were from the law’s most ardent support-
ers and opponents—as if the Justices did not know, or did not 
care, that to turn aspirations into law these boosters had to mol-
lify the moderates. Rodriguez and Weingast, by contrast, con-
cluded that enactment of Title VII depended on a deal between 
the northern Democrats (for whom Senators Case and Humphrey 
were the main spokesmen) and the northern Republicans (of 
whom Senator Dirksen and Representative Halleck were the 
leaders). There were no southern Republicans in Congress at the 
time. The Southern Democrats, and some moderates in both par-
ties, were the opposition. Looking at the statements by people 
who could make deals paints a different picture from the state-
ments of legislators who don’t play a role. 
But, as Rodriguez and Weingast recognize, Senator Humphrey 
and the others who had deal-killing power were playing to three 
audiences: voters, the press, and their colleagues. Only the last 
set of statements represents commitments, breach of which would 
be costly. Rodriguez and Weingast tracked down the actual com-
mitments, recorded in formal representations by the floor manag-
ers. According to Rodriguez and Weingast, these commitments 
 
 44 Judge Patricia M. Wald memorialized the phrase “looking over a crowd and pick-
ing out your friends,” but its origin is a quip by Judge Harold Leventhal. See Patricia M. 
Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court 
Term, 68 Iowa L Rev 195, 214 (1983). For a more empirical approach, see generally David 
S. Law and David Zaring, Law versus Ideology: The Supreme Court and the Use of Legis-
lative History, 51 Wm & Mary L Rev 1653 (2010). 
 45 This is the theme of Justice Rehnquist’s dissent, amplified in a careful study by 
my late colleague Professor Bernard D. Meltzer—who was no conservative. See Bernard 
D. Meltzer, The Weber Case: The Judicial Abrogation of the Antidiscrimination Standard 
in Employment, 47 U Chi L Rev 423, 444–47 (1980). 
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show the adoption of a rule of formal equality: employers are for-
bidden to give race any weight, except via a seniority system that 
could lock in yesteryear’s use of race—and the permissible role of 
seniority was the subject of extensive negotiations and a complex 
compromise. In other words, Rodriguez and Weingast concluded 
that the Justices in the majority were wrong for the wrong rea-
sons and the Justices in dissent were right for the wrong reasons. 
I admire this work. One might even call it a compelling 
demonstration that legislative history can be used reliably. But I 
don’t think that the McNollgast program in general, or the Rodri-
guez and Weingast exemplar in particular, should lead to an in-
crease in the use of legislative history. I can express my reason in 
six words: the article is 125 pages long. Perhaps I may be permit-
ted a few more words: the article was published twenty-four years 
after Weber. 
One of the academy’s most persistent illusions is a belief that 
judges have essentially unlimited time to decide cases and bring 
to bear universal expertise. Nothing else could support a system 
that allows judges to design the institutions of government, and 
to resolve society’s most complex moral problems, at the same 
time as they prescribe the details of automobile door handles. 
Some political scientists treat judges as automata who vote the 
platforms of the political parties that appointed them; for these 
judges, time is irrelevant, and so is McNollgast. But for those 
scholars who think that briefs, argument, and reasoning matter 
to courts, if only at the margin, the tradition is to assume that 
judges can devote as much time as is necessary to reach correct 
decisions and can apply the most sophisticated models drawn 
from economics, political science, engineering, and medicine. 
What a bunch of baloney! Judges are lawyers, not scholars; 
they are trained in making arguments, not in forming and testing 
hypotheses. Yes, some judges are scholars, but with the exception 
of Judge Richard Posner none has universal expertise. I claim 
none outside of economics and physics. Anyway, my point is that 
most judges lack any “law and . . . ” training. They can’t replicate 
the sophisticated work of Rodriguez and Weingast—and you can 
be sure that if one side hires an expert to do so, the other side will 
hire an expert to refute it. Professor George Stigler was fond of 
saying that there’s no proposition in economics so absurd that you 
can’t locate one reputable economist to vouch for it. He was right. 
And the proposition holds for political science, too. Lawyers can’t 
adjudicate such a contest. 
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It took Rodriguez and Weingast twenty-four years after Weber 
to do their work. Actually, the time is two years from when they 
began, but even that is too long for litigation, which on issues of 
law can reach the Supreme Court less than two years after the 
suit is filed. And Rodriguez and Weingast were not preparing six 
hundred other articles at the same time. 
Why six hundred? Because a federal appellate judge hears 
that many cases, or more, during a two-year span. Judges of the 
Seventh Circuit, where I sit, hear oral argument in about 150 
cases a year, and handle another 150 on briefs. Judges have lots 
of other duties, including attending conferences, resolving con-
tested motions, and handling the administrative side of the 
courts, which are large institutions. Suppose we ignore all of that 
time. A judge who spends two thousand hours a year to resolve 
three hundred appeals has less than seven hours per case to read 
the district court’s opinion and essential portions of the record, 
read the briefs (which can exceed one hundred pages per appeal), 
read any relevant precedents, hear argument, discuss the appeal 
with colleagues, write a draft (or, if not writing, read a colleague’s 
draft), and participate in the give-and-take among judges that 
turns drafts into published opinions. The Supreme Court hears 
fewer cases on the merits and spreads the opinion writing more 
widely, but it also has more discussion per case because it is 
harder to forge agreement among nine judges than among three. 
Even on the most optimistic view, a Justice can devote less than 
twenty hours to each argued case. 
Yet Rodriguez and Weingast needed two years and 125 pages 
to analyze the legislative history of one clause of Title VII. That 
took more than twenty hours. Judges, who lack training in social 
science, would need more time than specialists; but judges actu-
ally have substantially less. 
Rules of interpretation must reflect the resources available to 
the task. I argued over twenty years ago that this implies a rela-
tively simple and mechanical approach to interpretation,46 and 
nothing I have seen since has changed my mind. Schauer elabo-
rated on that view by contrasting the way in which experts ap-
proach the task of interpreting legal texts with the way in which 
 
 46 See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, What’s So Special about Judges?, 61 U Colo 
L Rev 773 (1990); Easterbrook, 50 U Chi L Rev 533 (cited in note 3). 
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amateurs should proceed.47 Experts try for the best and most nu-
anced understanding; amateurs should use the approach that 
causes the least damage when it goes wrong. And judges are am-
ateurs. I may be a specialist in judging, but I’m an amateur in tax 
law, labor law, immigration law, and the other fields that federal 
courts handle. Judges are experts only in criminal law, which oc-
cupies perhaps a third of our docket. I know something about cor-
porate and securities law, and Judge Posner knows about anti-
trust and torts; we’re not amateurs across the board. But when 
judges are amateurs, which is most of the time, we should use an 
appropriately modest interpretive strategy.48 
The modest treatment of legislative history is the one that 
ignores it, in favor of the actual enacted text. Relying on text does 
the least harm, for the text is visible to everyone, while legislative 
history can take people by surprise (especially given judicial dis-
cretion about which history to emphasize, a choice that judges 
lack when dealing with enacted texts). So, much as I admire 
McNollgast, I don’t think that political science has shown how 
legislative history can be used beneficially. 
 
 47 See Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of 
Plain Meaning, 1990 S Ct Rev 231, 231–32; Frederick Schauer, The Practice and Problems 
of Plain Meaning: A Response to Aleinikoff and Shaw, 45 Vand L Rev 715, 733 (1992); 
Frederick Schauer, The Dilemma of Ignorance: PGA Tour, Inc. v Casey Martin, 2001 S Ct 
Rev 267, 268–69. 
 48 See Adrian Vermeule, Judging under Uncertainty: An Institutional Theory of Le-
gal Interpretation 289–90 (Harvard 2006). 
